I try to make progress on the traditional "big questions" in the philosophy of mind by using recent science as well a priori methods. In my essays, I systematically develop a "consciousness first" approach to the mind, which has consequences for the mind-body problem and the foundations of intentionality. My essays fall into four categories:
Perception: In my essays on perception, I argue for the intentional view of sensory consciousness over rivals such as naive realism. Select publications here and here.
Puzzle of acquaintance: On my intentional view, experience involves an acquaintance relation to sensible properties. Neuroscience supports phenomenal internalism. So our standard "externalist" models (Dretske, Tye) do not apply to this relation. Acquaintance is irreducible (as Russell thought), even if it is "grounded" in physical conditions. So here materialists need brute "grounding connections", no better than brute supervenience connections. Select publications: here and here.
The sensible qualities: I argue that the sensible qualities we are acquainted with are neither "in the mind" nor "in the world": they are uninstantiated. This may considered a new version of the traditional Galilean view. Select publications: here and here.
Consciousness first: Once we see that conscious acquaintance is not something that must be explained in other terms, we can see it as starting point that can help us to explain other things (justification, cognition, value). Select publications:hereand here.