I try to make progress on the traditional "big questions" in the philosophy of mind by using recent science as well a priori methods. In my essays, I systematically develop a "consciousness first" approach to the mind, which has consequences for the mind-body problem and the foundations of intentionality. My essays fall into four categories:

 

Perception: In my essays on perception, I argue for the intentional view of sensory consciousness over rivals such as naive realism. Select publications here and here

 

Puzzle of acquaintance: On my intentional view, experience involves an acquaintance relation to sensible properties. Neuroscience supports phenomenal internalism. So our standard "externalist" models (Dretske, Tye) do not apply to this relation. Acquaintance is irreducible (as Russell thought), even if it is "grounded" in physical conditions. So here materialists need brute "grounding connections", no better than brute supervenience connections. Select publications: here and here

 

The sensible qualities: I argue that the sensible qualities we are acquainted with are neither "in the mind" nor "in the world": they are uninstantiated. This may considered a new version of the traditional Galilean view. Select publications: here and here.

 

Consciousness first:  Once we see that conscious acquaintance is not something that must be explained in other terms, we can see it as starting point that can help us to explain other things (justification, cognition, value). Select publications: here and here.

 

 

Adam      Pautz

pH.D                      new york university

Links   to     ESsays       etc.

 

How can brains in vats experience space? A puzzle (with Block reply, Speaks discussion)

What is my evidence that here is a cup?

Does phenomenology ground content? (discussion by Chudnoff here and here)

Perception: how mind connects to world (forthcoming with Routledge)

Brewer Against the Content View

NDPR review of Langsam, The Wonder of Consciousness

The real trouble with armchair arguments against phenomenal externalism ()

Is experience predicative: comments on Mark Johnston (Johnston's paper is here)

Mark Johnston's Puzzle about Personites

Do the benefits of naive realism outweigh the costs? (with Fish's reply)

The real trouble with phenomenal externalism (Hilbert&Klein reply and Chirimuuta discussion

Ignoring the real problem for phenomenal externalism: a reply to Hilbert and Klein

Review of Hill's Consciousness.

Does the rich content view of experience matter?

Does spatial perception undermine standard intentionalism?

How can experience give us knowledge of abstracta?

Can disjunctivists explain our access to the sensible world?

Do theories of consciousness rest on a mistake? (discussion by Hill here and by Levine here)

Why explain visual experience in terms of content? (discussion by Brewer here and here).

How does experience present the world?

Rententionalism vs Extensionalism about Time-Consciousness

New Leibniz's Law Arguments Against Identity Theory (with Shoemaker's reply and my response) 

NDPR review of Cohen, The Red and the Real

A simple view of consciousness (with Cutter&Tye reply, and my response)

Theories of colour

Color Irrealism (discussion by Cohen here). 

The content of color experience and the light view

What are the contents of experiences?

An argument against fregean that-clause semantics (discussion by Schiffer here)

The interdependence of phenomenology and intentionality

Intentionalism and perceptual presence (discussions by Schellenberg and Tye)

Intentionalism and the laws of appearance

Sensory awareness is not wide (replies from Chalmers, Cohen, Byrne&Tye, Lycan)

Can colour structure be explained in terms of colour experience? (Cohen discussion here)

Byrne and Hilbert on the unitary-binary structure of color (their reply here)

Against Armstrong's analysis of resemblance between universals (Armstrong's reply)